道阻且更长

道阻且更长

来源:海立方线上平台 | 时间:2016-12-07

约4000亿美元的人民币存款为离岸人民币,主要位于亚洲。但是,即便在香港和新加坡这两个亚洲主要金融中心,离岸美元存款是离岸人民币存款的4倍。过去两年,这一比例波动极小。人民币存款通常是投机性的。提高存款的离岸银行无法再次将它们全盘借出,因此,它们不得不将现金暂存于中国大陆的银行中。香港银行家希望,鉴于人们对人民币再度贬值忧心忡忡,人民币存款将会下滑。

A more international China could escape its subordinate role in the dollar zone. Allowing the yuan to float might, in time, help the economy adjust better and bring down trade imbalances. Prising open the capital account would make it easier for foreigners to buy Chinese bonds and shares and help the yuan become a global currency. If Chinese firms can trade and borrow abroad in yuan and use fewer dollars, China will feel less inclined to hoard dollar reserves. There would be collateral benefits: China would be forced to reform its financial markets, which allocate capital sloppily.

为使这一过程更加安全,中国需将一系列的改革纳入考虑。这包括了对股市监管进行改革;使央行更加独立;出售政府在央企中的股份,以增加可交易资产净值的供应;由于储户在国外面临更多选择,国有银行需做好应对可能发生的存款挤兑准备;允许大型私营企业资产管理行业蓬勃发展,出售外国商品。中国不得不面对国际资本流动的不断进出,在弹指之间调整资产价格。

更为国际化的中国可以摆脱在美元区中的从属角色。允许人民币浮动或许会及时帮助中国经济体更好地适应、从而减少贸易不平衡。撬开资本账户的大门可以让外国人更加便捷地购买中国债券和股票,帮助人民币成为全球货币。如果中国公司可以更少使用美元,转而通过人民币进行贸易、外资借贷,中国囤积美元储备的需求也会随之减小。额外好处还有:中国将会被迫改革其金融市场,扭转毫无章法地分配资本的局势。

Eventually the offshore yuan world could become much bigger (although not as large as the dollar archipelago). The yuan has a sizeable lender of last resort, in the form of the swap lines the People’s Bank of China extends to foreign central banks. Offshore deposits are governed by laws made in Hong Kong and elsewhere, so investors do not have to worry about China’s legal system. China might well develop ways to protect its payments system from America’s extraterritorial laws. It will be possible?if not easy?to use a yuan deposit in London to do business in China. The paperwork needed to use it to buy a security, asset, good or service on the mainland will be streamlined over time.

Hong Kong has its own laws, institutions and currency, which has been pegged to the dollar for 32 years. Shares are mainly priced and paid for in Hong Kong dollars. They often trade at different prices to those listed on the Shanghai bourse, which is isolated and badly regulated, sometimes leading to distorted share prices. Only 11% of Hong Kong’s bank deposits are in yuan, compared with 30% in American dollars. Most of the capital raised on its markets is in its own currency or the greenback. A global bank, HSBC, is considering shifting its headquarters from London to Hong Kong, but only if it is supervised by the special territory’s impressive independent monetary authority, not the mainland’s regulators. Hong Kong’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, invests six times more in regulated businesses in the West than in his motherland of mainland China.

China is the world’s biggest commodity buyer, but oil is traded in dollars. Perhaps Saudi Arabia, which now sells as much oil to China as it does to America, could be persuaded to accept some yuan, despite its reliance on American fighter planes and missiles. In 2010, at the height of the commodities boom, global mining firms forced China to shift from long-term contracts to market-based pricing. Now that the miners are on their knees, China can bully them in turn. State-backed banks, too, could be prodded to do more. China’s biggest bank, ICBC, has substantial operations in South-East Asia, only some of which involve yuan.

最终,离岸人民币世界或会变得更加庞大(尽管比不上美元群岛的面积)。人民币是规模可观的最后贷款者,其形式为互换额度由中国人民银行延伸至外国中央银行。离岸存款由香港及其他地方制定的法律监管,因此,投资者们无需为中国法律体制而烦恼。中国或许会寻求方案,以保护其支付体系免受美国治外法律的限制。虽然不简单,但如果可能的话,我们也可以利用在伦敦的人民币存款在中国做生意。随着时间推移,利用该笔资金在中国大陆购买证券、资产、货品和服务的文件将会简化。

道阻且更长

The Marxist books that China’s leaders once studied suggest that such contradictions must lead to change, and there is something to this. For example, huge sums now drain out of China through cracks in its great edifice of rules, ending up in Manhattan property and Swiss bonds. Allowing foreigners to buy more Chinese shares and bonds would create a counterbalancing inflow. But China’s potential to play an economic role in the world to rival America’s rests mainly in the hands of its leaders, and they must weigh their vaulting ambitions against their deep fear of instability.

那么,为什么不直截了当地开放中国,而要将其与世界相隔离呢?这又要回到稳定性这个老问题了。随着资金从送四面八方流入,完全开放的资本账户会带来震荡。证券供不应求。中国股市自由交易的份额也仅与瑞士相当。中央政府的债券市场的价值则仅略胜于英国。随着中国人民试图使投资组合更为多样化,或者将资产转移至更为安全之地,没人知道会有多少资金流出。过去12个月里,潜在资本流出达到了惊人的5000亿美元。

对不稳定的恐惧也对改革者形成阻碍,不愿大步前行。中国受限的金融体系有多处漏洞,然而政府却不愿作出调整,变更为在几经洗牌的全球市场中经历过外国资本反复洗礼的体系。其目的是敞开中国资本账户,www.87739.com,但对自由度设限,对资金流入及流出施以精细条款,从而阻止投机者。

野心 VS 稳定

China is on course to be a giant in trade and direct investment and a mid-sized power in finance, currencies and financial markets. That tempered ambition might be in its own interest, but it does not resolve the problems of the global financial and monetary system. China will not be a counterbalance to or a substitute for America soon. So what will fill the vacuum?

But these figures are misleading, since they include mainland trade with Hong Kong, where about half of all payments are in yuan. If that is left out of account, the share of China’s trade with the world conducted in yuan comes down to below 10%. The proportion of yuan payments over the SWIFT system used by global banks is only 1%. China’s big trade partners barely use the yuan in their bilateral trade with the Middle Kingdom. The figure for Australia is 0.7% of bilateral payments with China. Of South Korea’s exports to China, 94% are paid for in dollars and 2.9% in yuan.

Behold the skilfully drafted articles of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), signed in June at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing by 50 countries, including 13 members of NATO as well as such cosy bedfellows as Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia (the main holdouts are America, Canada, Japan and Mexico). It will have $20 billion of paid-in capital and a further $80 billion of callable capital. China has 26% of the votes, giving it a veto over hiring and firing the bank’s boss, big capital raisings, constitutional changes and booting out members. America may be uneasy about that, but China could point out that it is supplying 30% of the capital and that it is mimicking America’s vetoes at the IMF and the World Bank. Jin Liqun, the AIIB’s boss, sought advice in Washington about how to set it up.

忍受和羡慕这些吧:中国央行与另外32家外国央行价值5000亿美元的人民币互换额度,(与美联储授信额度相等);中国国有银行可在17家全球贸易中心,包括多哈和多伦多中清算人民币业务;1460亿美元的限额,允许离岸人民币通过证券市场进入国内(香港证交所和上海证交所每天彼此直接交易额同样达到400亿美元);以及落户中国、计划于今年投入使用的人民币清算系统,该系统与供外国银行使用的纽约清算所银行同业支付系统相似。

不稳定局势的威胁极为重要。倘若增长放缓,中国的改革者或许会面对来自于反对改革的特权阶层的攻击:国有银行保证贷款息差,国有企业获得补贴贷款,以美元借贷的出口商推断人民币只会升值。从中国近代历史中,我们学到的教训是,更深层次的改革定会发生,然有滞后。1989-90年,平息通货膨胀失败,爆发了血腥的天安门事件,中国经济增长放缓至4%。1992年,邓小平通过著名的“南巡”重申权力,在此期间,他推动了市场改革,智胜党内保守派。

增长尚未触底。据中方官方数字显示,目前的增长率为7%,信心不足的私人预测者则认为,5%更为合理。目前,政府已犹豫不决。中国寻求了国际货币基金组织的特别提款权,这是该组织精英货币的摇篮。这一举动也彰显了中国的国际野心,及其得到由美国设计的机构认可的需求。但中国也笨拙地试图维持股票市场。今年8月的人民币贬值既可以解读为一次改革,以使人民币交易更为自由,也可以理解成一次慌张之举,以扭转中国过去的重商主义贸易政策,从而促进出口。这也成为中国央行行长周小川先生为数不多的失策,他在美国一向被视为最坚守自由改革的中国领导人。

尽管人民币进步缓慢,它终将拥有影响力。国家的进一步推动将有所帮助。例如,外国公司如果在向中国购买商品时以人民币进行支付,可以获得折扣或赢得嘉奖。韩国巨头三星计划以人民币形式在其中国子公司与总部间进行资金流通。

As a reserve asset the yuan is peripheral. Other Asian central banks complain that it is hard to buy yuan government bonds; China’s putative membership of the SDR basket does not solve this problem. As a store of value for the private sector it has yet to step up to the big league. Of international bonds issued in 2014, just 1.4% were in yuan. McDonald’s, among others, has issued yuan bonds, but 96% of its debts are in dollars, euros, sterling or yen.

So why not go the whole way and open up China instead of walling it off from the world? It comes back to the question of stability. A fully open capital account could cause a shock as money from around the world floods in. There are not enough securities available. The freely traded bit of China’s stockmarket is only the size of Switzerland’s. The value of the central-government bond market is only a bit bigger than Britain’s. And no one knows how much cash might flood out as Chinese people try to diversify their portfolios or put their assets somewhere safer. In the past 12 months the underlying capital outflows have reached a staggering $500 billion.

中国是世界上最大的采购商,可石油却是以美元进行交易。沙特阿拉伯目前向中国和美国销售同等数量的石油,尽管沙特阿拉伯需依赖于美国的歼击机和导弹,或许中国可以说服其接受人民币。2010年,商品繁荣呈现井喷,全球矿业公司迫使中国由长期合同转为市场导向定价法。既然矿业公司现在俯首称臣,中国可以以牙还牙。受国家支持的银行也同样可以如此践行。中国最大的银行工商银行在东南亚拥有庞大的业务量,可只有部分业务是以人民币进行。

When China devalued its currency by 3% in early August, unnerving global markets, Hong Kong’s officials and bankers were as perplexed as everyone else. Even China’s central bank, which implemented the policy, seemed confused. It issued a statement promising nothing less than a system that would “keep the exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level, enabling the market rate to play its role, and improving the managed floating exchange-rate regime based on market demand and supply”. Rather than soothe nerves, this tortured prose prompted a big question. Does the pressure resulting from China’s slowdown detract from its ambition to rival America on the world economic stage?

Ambition v stability

China’s economy is open in some ways and closed in others, combining to form an incoherent whole. Foreigners can build factories but not buy bonds. China’s firms are the world’s second-biggest cross-border investors as measured by their stock of direct investment, but its private fund managers are an irrelevance; three streets in Edinburgh host more international assets. Mainland consumers can buy BMW cars and Gucci handbags, but not shares in the firms that make them. The People’s Bank of China (along with related agencies) is probably the biggest investor in the world’s most transparent bond market, but is itself as opaque as the Huangpu river. State banks lend like lions to Africa but are as timid as mice in Western capital markets. When China stumbles, the price of oil tumbles, but the oil-derivatives contracts that reflect this are traded elsewhere.

A longer march

感叹由中国主导、正在运作的贸易协定吧,不仅是包括中国、印度和其他14个亚洲国家(涵盖30%世界生产总值)的区域全面经济伙伴关系协定。这一协定计划于2016年完成。中国正与印度、海湾国家(包括沙特阿拉伯)和东盟中的东南亚国家商讨双边自由贸易协定事宜。习近平的“一带一路”战略也提出构想,在交通和贸易上能延伸至西欧。

然而,由于这些数字计算了中国大陆与香港的贸易,因而存在着误导性。这是因为中国大陆与香港间一半的贸易都是以人民币进行支付。如将其剔除在外,那么中国与世界各国以人民币支付进行交易的份额将跌破10%。全球银行通过环球银行财务通讯系统进行的人民币支付仅占比1%。中国的主要贸易合作伙伴极少通过人民币与中国进行双边贸易。澳大利亚与中国的双边支付中,这一数字为0.7%。而韩国对中国的出口商品中,94%以美元支付,2.9%以人民币支付。

China shakes the world?but not in the way it hoped

想要验证中国作为经济霸权的地位,只需从中国大陆穿过边境,进入香港特别行政区。那是一座国际金融中心,也是中国形形色色的野心的试验田,www.87739.com。香港经济有赖于与中国大陆进行贸易往来,其本身也是人民币银行业务的中心。许多商店和机器都接受人民币付款。然而,即便是香港,即便地处于中国大陆边境,即便已是中国最为开放的城市,距离接受中国金融习惯依然有着漫漫长路。

It is not only China’s pride that demands a bigger international role but economic logic too. Future trade deals covering new areas such as cybercrime and e-commerce could be tailored to fit China’s needs, rather than China having to adopt someone else’s rules, as it had to do in 2001 to qualify for WTO membership. With a bigger voice over development lending to poor countries, China could expand and protect its investments.

香港有着自己的法律、制度和货币,港币与美元挂钩已有32年。股票也主要以港币标价及支付。这些股票通常以异于上海证券交易所的挂牌价格进行交易,后者由于独立监管且力度不足,因此有时会造成股票价格的扭曲。香港银行中,只有11%的存款为人民币,而美元存款则占到了30%。大部分在香港市场筹得的资本均为港币或美元。作为一家全球银行,汇丰银行正考虑将其总部由伦敦迁至香港。然而,其前提条件是,银行监管者是香港特别行政区极为独立的金融管理局,而非大陆的监管机构。香港首富李嘉诚在西方监管业务中的投资额是在他的故土中国大陆的6倍。

Stand and admire the yuan swap lines between China’s central bank and 32 foreign ones, worth $500 billion (on a par with the Fed’s dollar lines); 17 hubs trading around the world, including Doha and Toronto, where China’s state banks clear yuan deals; quotas that let $146 billion of offshore yuan enter the country via the stockmarket (Hong Kong’s stock exchange and Shanghai’s also trade directly with each other to the tune of $4 billion a day); and a China-based yuan clearing system equivalent to the New York dollar one for foreign banks due to open this year.

且看亚洲基础设施投资银行(亚投行)于6月在北京长城签署的精雕细琢起草的协定。该协定由50个国家签署,包括13个北约成员国和趋炎附势的同床异梦者,如伊朗、伊拉克和沙特阿拉伯(美国、加拿大、日本和墨西哥则拒不参与)。其实缴股本的票面总价值为200亿美元,待缴股本的票面总价值为800亿美元。中国投票权占总投票权的26%,在任免行长、筹集资本、法案更改和剔除成员问题上享有一票否决权。美国或许对此忧心忡忡,但中国可以指出,其认缴股本占总数的30%,同时也是模仿美国在国际货币基金组织和世界银行所享有的一票否决权。亚投行行长金立群在华盛顿就创建事宜寻求了建议。

由政府主导的基础设施和外交政策尚未能立即取得卓越成效。最为保险的灵药是人民币仍然微不足道的名望。作为一种支付方式,乍一看,人民币似乎正在取得快速发展。据称,当前中国约四分之一的贸易和外商直接投资流量是以人民币进行。

不仅是中国的自尊心,其经济逻辑同样要求更为重要的国际角色。中国未来的贸易协定会覆盖新的领域,如网络犯罪和电子商务,这些领域都为中国的需求量身定,而非如2001为加入世贸组织时,中国为适应他人的规则而委曲求全。现如今,中国在向贫困国家提供资金贷款以助其发展的问题上拥有了更大的话语权,它也渴望能扩大、保护投资。

None of this government-directed infrastructure and diplomacy has yet had much impact on the ground. The surest measure of this is the still-puny stature of the yuan. As a means of payment, it appears at first sight to be making rapid progress. About a quarter of China’s trade and foreign direct investment flows are now said to be in yuan.

An open society

在一些领域中的开放和在其余领域中的封闭形成了支离破碎的中国经济。外商可以在中国开办工厂,但不能购买债券。根据直接投资份额,中国公司是世界上第二大跨国投资者,然而中国的私募基金经理人的景象却浑然不同;爱丁堡的三条街道主持着更多国际资产。中国大陆消费者可以购买宝马轿车和古驰手袋,却不能购买这些产品的制造公司的股票。中国人民银行(及有关机构)或许是世界上最为透明的债券市场中的头号投资商,然其本身却如浑浊的黄浦江水般让人琢磨不透。国有银行如猛兽般向非洲敞开借款的大门,而在西方资产市场中,却如老鼠般畏手畏脚。当中国步履蹒跚时,石油价格也骤然暴跌,而体现这一趋势的石油衍生物合同却在别处进行交易。

Marvel at the China-anchored trade deals now in the works, not least a pact known as RCEP that takes in China, India and 14 other Asian countries which between them generate 30% of world GDP. It is due to be completed in 2016. China is discussing bilateral trade deals with India, the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, and the ASEAN club of South-East Asian countries. President Xi Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative envisages Chinese investment and transport links stretching as far as western Europe.

Opening up China is a political question, and the party is not ready. Given the loss of power this would involve, it may never be. James Carville, an adviser to Bill Clinton, once said that he would like to be reincarnated as America’s bond market, because it could intimidate anyone. Xi Jinping is not about to let China’s bond market boss him.

Although the yuan has made only slight progress so far, it will gradually gain clout. An even bigger shove from the state could help. Foreign firms could be offered discounts or win brownie points if they buy from China using the redback. Samsung, a South Korean colossus, plans to settle flows between its Chinese subsidiaries and its headquarters in yuan.

The danger of instability is pressingly important. If growth slows down, China’s reformers may face attacks from the vested interests that oppose change: state banks with guaranteed lending margins, state-owned firms that get subsidised loans, exporters that have borrowed in dollars assuming the yuan can only go up. The lesson from China’s modern history is that deeper reforms do happen, though with a lag. In 1989-90 growth slowed to 4% after a botched attempt to quell inflation and the bloody events of Tiananmen Square. By 1992 Deng Xiaoping had reasserted his power through his famous “southern tour”, in the course of which he pushed for market reforms and outwitted the party’s conservatives.

Fear of instability limits how far even the reformers are willing to go. China’s repressed financial system leaks and strains in many places, but the government does not want to swap this for one that gets battered as waves of foreign capital from global markets wash in and out. The aim is to make China’s capital account open, but not freely so, imposing fiddly rules on inflows and outflows to put off speculators.

Softly, softly

中国领导人一度研习的马克思主义书籍提到,诸如此类的矛盾势必会引发变革,这一说法不无道理。例如,看似伟大的规则中的种种漏洞造成了中国的巨额流失,流向了曼哈顿地产和瑞士债券。为获得资金流入以抗衡这一资金流失,中国应允许外国人购买更多中国股票及债券。然而,中国在世界经济中扮演重要角色、与美国相抗衡的潜力主要掌握在其领导人的手中,他们必须权衡过于膨胀的野心和对陷入不稳定局面的深深恐惧。

Some $400 billion-worth of yuan deposits sit offshore, mainly in Asia. But even in Hong Kong and Singapore, Asia’s main financial centres, the value of offshore dollar deposits is four times larger than that of yuan ones. This ratio has changed only slightly over the past two years. Redback deposits are often speculative. Offshore banks that raise them are unable to lend them all out again, so they have to park the cash in mainland banks. Bankers in Hong Kong expect yuan deposits to decline as people worry about further Chinese devaluations.

中国渴望在海外成为经济大国,但需遵循他自己的意愿。中国业已建立了相当于金融货币领域的“十车道高速公路”,但却无人通行,或者说是一座布满摩天大楼的鬼城。政府建立的基础设施已矗立于此,却仍然无人问津。

审慎耐心

TO TEST CHINA’S chops as an economic hegemon, just walk across the border from mainland China into the special territory of Hong Kong, a global financial centre and a laboratory of sorts for China’s ambitions. It lives on trade with the mainland and is a hub for yuan banking. Many shops and machines accept the redback. Yet even this place, on mainland China’s border and as open as an economy can get, remains a long way from adopting China’s financial habits.

The ambition part of this is easy to understand. At a minimum China wants the natural privileges a vast economy might expect: a big say over global rules of finance and trade and a widely used currency. Gone are the days when its policymakers played little brother to America’s. (“I understand,” said Hu Jintao, China’s president, in September 2006 when American officials privately requested that the yuan rise 3% by December to placate Congress. By the following May it was up 3.5%). During the financial crisis China realised that its reserves could be at risk from American devaluation or even default. By 2009 Zhou Xiaochuan, the boss of China’s central bank, was calling for a new world reserve currency to replace the dollar.

To make this process safer, China would need to consider a number of reforms. These include overhauling its stockmarket regulation; making its central bank more independent; selling the government’s shares in state-run firms to increase the supply of tradable equity; preparing state-run banks for a possible deposit run as savers get more choice abroad; and allowing a large private-sector asset-management industry to flourish and sell foreign products. China would have to brace itself for global capital flows rushing in and out, changing asset prices in an instant.

China wants to be an economic superpower abroad, but on its own terms. It has built the international monetary equivalent of a ten-lane motorway with no cars on it, or a ghost city of skyscrapers. The government-built infrastructure is there, but so far the people have not come.

中国的野心不难理解。至少,中国渴望身为一个庞大的经济体理应享有的特权:全球金融贸易规则中的重要话语权,及广泛通行的货币。中国政策制定者对美国领导人唯唯诺诺的日子已一去不复返。(“我明白,”2006年9月,中国主席胡锦涛这样说道,作为美国官员私下请求其于12月将人民币升值3%以安抚国会的回答。次年5月,人民币升值了3.5%。)金融危机中,中国意识到其储备或许会因美元贬值甚至债务违约而处境危险。2009年,中国人民银行行长周小川呼吁,使新的储备货币以取代美元。

中国正成为贸易和直接投资强国,以及财政、货币和金融市场中等强国。这一温和的野心或许正中其下怀,但并没有解决国际金融货币体系的问题。短时间内,中国无法与美国相抗衡,或成为其替代品。那么,谁又能填补这一空白?

开放中国是一项政治问题,中国共产党对此并未严阵以待,或许永远都不会,因为这项问题或许会使共产党失权。詹姆斯?卡维尔是比尔?克林顿的顾问,他曾说,他希望能投胎转世成美国债券市场,因为它可以令任何人倍感威胁。习近平则不会任由自己受到中国债券市场的摆布。

8月初,中国将人民币贬值3%,这一举措使得整个国际市场惴惴不安,香港官员及银行家也同所有人一样,茫然不知所措。甚至连执行这一政策的中国央行都略显迷茫。央行发表声明,承诺将建立体系以“维持人民币汇率基本稳定在合理平衡范围内,发挥市场在人民币汇率形成中的作用,继续完善以市场供求为基础、有管理的浮动汇率制度。”然而这并没有打消顾虑,相反,这一令人困惑的陈词滥调引发了一个大问题。由中国脚步放缓而引发的压力,是否转移了其试图与美国在世界经济舞台上相抗衡的野心?

Growth has not got that low yet. Official figures suggest that it is currently 7%, and bearish private forecasters think 5% is plausible. So far the government has dithered. It has pursued membership of the SDR, the IMF’s basket of elite currencies, a symbol of its international ambitions and its need for validation by American-designed institutions. But it has also made a clumsy attempt to prop up its stockmarkets. The devaluation of the yuan in August this year can be read either as a reform to make the redback more freely tradable or an act of panic to boost exports that tilts China back towards the mercantilist policies of the past. It has been a rare misstep by Mr Zhou, the head of China’s central bank, who is widely seen in America as the Chinese leader most committed to liberal reforms.

中国震撼了整个世界??却与其期望相去甚远

作为储备资产,www.87739.com,人民币也并未占据重要地位。其他亚洲央行抱怨,购买人民币政府债券极为困难;中国享有公认的特别提款权,然也并未解决该问题。作为私营部门的价值储存手段,人民币尚未跻身大联盟。2014年发行的国际债券中,仅1.4%为人民币债券。同其他公司一样,麦当劳也发行了人民币债券,然其96%的债务形式是美元、欧元、英镑或日元。

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